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CHAPTER 8
Quiet Transformation from the Bottom:
Emerging Transnational Networks
Among Non-State Actors in Northeast
Asia Community-Building
Seung Youn Oh
In Northeast Asia, an extensive web of informal intra-regional economic
and cultural integration coexists with fractious political and security issues
that often hinder potential cooperation. The combined experience of
colonization at the turn of the twentieth century and the historical rem-
nants of the Cold War led to the regional states developing a strong sense
of nationalism and intense commitment to the ideals of Westphalian
sovereignty.1 Traditional security concerns dominate the region, and
nation-states remain the focus of most discussions regarding regional
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1Chung-In Moon and Chaesung Chun, “Sovereignty: Dominance of the Westphalian
Concept and Implications for Regional Security,” in Asian Security Order: Instrumental and
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integration. These fundamental realities explain the relative lack of formal
and institutionalized cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea.2
Yet, the region is also marked by significant instances of successful
democratization and breathtaking economic development. These political
and economic achievements have granted a wide range of non-state actors
the opportunity to be part of the regional integration process and brought
about developmental challenges that require collective action. If analysis of
community-building efforts in Northeast Asia is fixated on the level of the
nation-state and the central government, then one fails to capture the
complex, transnational integration dynamics that are now vigorously at
work in the region. In particular, non-state actors—less constrained than
national authorities by political tensions and historical legacies—are not
only generating a new capacity for regional community-building, they are
also strengthening existing forms of regional cooperation.
At the sub-national level, local governments in China, Japan, and South
Korea have deepened their inter-city networks through social, cultural, and
economic cooperative projects while sharing knowledge about opportu-
nities and challenges inherent in the processes of industrialization and
urbanization. At the same time, multinational corporations are expanding
their transnational operations in the region through global and regional
production networks. Such trans-national commercial linkages raise busi-
ness actors’ interest in regionally collaborative economic policies and
political relations.
Transnational “epistemic communities” among scholars, experts, and
think tanks have also played a key role in deepening regional cooperation at
the ideational level by identifying common issues and proposing shared
solutions across borders and issue areas. Civil society actors have become
indispensable participants in raising public awareness of various issues
transnationally, providing knowledge and expertise for how best to resolve
problems, and often acting as pressure groups for the enactment of national
and regional-level policies. This wide range of actors has ushered in a new
era of regional community-building in Northeast Asia by bringing about
2Kent Calder and Min Ye, The Making of Northeast Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2010); Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, Network Power: Japan and Asia
(Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 1997); Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s
Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2004).
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quiet transformations below the nation-state level, both in spite of and
because of political uncertainties.
This chapter explores how non-state actors in Northeast Asia in both
individual countries and at the regional level serve as transnational con-
stituencies and create regional networks to solve shared problems.
Northeast Asia—encompassing Japan, China, the two Koreas, Taiwan,
Mongolia, and the Russian Far East—consists of countries with a wide
variety of political systems and differing levels of economic development.
This chapter pays special attention to the networks and coalitions of
non-state actors in China, Japan, and South Korea to assess the opportu-
nities and challenges non-state actors face in overcoming the political and
historical tensions in one of the least institutionalized regions in the world.
I argue that despite the embryonic stage of multilateral networks of
non-state actors from these three countries, issue-based and cross-border
civil society collaboration has generated a new capacity for reaching con-
sensus about how to tackle common problems and for strengthening re-
gional cooperation. Their operations can bypass “high politics” at the
national government level because their agenda does not directly mirror
ongoing political tensions. Also, in the face of pressing domestic devel-
opmental challenges in issue areas such as energy insecurity and environ-
mental degradation, Northeast Asian countries need support from
non-state actors in terms of new ideas, scientific knowledge, field experi-
ence, and capacity for mass mobilization. Thus, examining how non-state
actors are relevant to building a regional framework in Northeast Asia is
both a normative and practical endeavor.
In identifying sources of regional cooperation from a multifaceted
perspective, this chapter provides a three-part overview of non-state actor
networks for transnational community-building efforts in Northeast Asia.
The first section begins with a discussion of the emergence of non-state
actors and their roles in regional community-building. The second section
identifies the nature and characteristics of networks developing among
various non-state actors in the region by examining case studies of
cross-national activism and cooperative projects undertaken by local gov-
ernments and civil society. In so doing, I suggest that inter-city and
cross-border networks among non-state actors tend to focus on a single
issue and be more effective in addressing non-traditional security problems.
Non-state actors’ participation in community-building is not completely
immune to underlying political dynamics in the region, and is often con-
strained by state-society relations in various countries. Nevertheless, this
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chapter concludes with the argument that non-state actors’ participation in
regional community-building allows the concept of an East Asian
Community to move past an elusive dream to a reachable possibility.
UNDERSTANDING THE MULTILAYERED FORCES OF REGIONAL
INTEGRATION
An Emerging Space for Non-state Actors in Northeast Asia
This chapter begins with the recognition that non-state actors in Northeast
Asia do not constitute a single category and that trans-border interactions
among non-state actors are not all part of one coherent movement. Rather
than imposing a variety of idealized definitions that are fraught with ana-
lytical confusion, this chapter conceptualizes non-state actors as a broad
spectrum of organizations that coexist in the space between the
nation-state (represented as the central government) and the market.
Non-state actors are defined here with respect to the degree to which they
operate autonomously based on shared values and goals, as opposed to
mirroring the priorities set by nation-states or the market. Hence, this
sector includes not only civil society groups (such as nongovernmental
organizations [NGOs], professional organizations, and think tanks), but
also some sub-national government actors (such as local governments or
networks of like-minded government officials who often act in a civilian
capacity).
From a cross-regional perspective, Northeast Asia has lagged behind
Southeast Asia, where various non-state actors have institutionalized their
cross-national collaborations and successfully gained access to policymak-
ing through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from as
early as the 1970s.3 While it got off to a slower start, Northeast Asia
3Soon after its founding, ASEAN began incorporating non-state actors and non-security
related matters in its regional program and formulating regional objectives. In 1972, active
business sector involvement in many of ASEAN’s economic integration initiatives resulted in
the establishment of the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI)—the
main vehicle through which the business community communicates its concerns on regional
economic issues to ASEAN. ASEAN-CCI played a key role in the creation of the ASEAN Free
Trade Area (AFTA) in the early 1990s. (Paul Bowles, “ASEAN, AFTA, and the ‘New
Regionalism,’” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 2 (1997), 219–33; J. L. Tongzon, The Economies
of Southeast Asia, 2nd edition (Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing
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witnessed a rapid expansion of regional collaborations during the 1990s
and 2000s, with Track II dialogues on East Asian Community Building,
inter-city collaboration, and civil society activism. These partial successes in
state-to-state diplomacy created meaningful links between societies that
previously had only tenuous connections—links that would ultimately
generate new opportunities for individuals and civil society organizations to
operate and interact autonomously without direction from the state or
market forces. This emerging space for non-state actors to play vital roles in
community-building needs to be seen in the context of changing
inter-state relations at the macro level, as well as the political and economic
changes taking place in the domestic politics of respective countries in the
region.
First, major geopolitical changes and several financial crises have
prompted East Asian countries to move toward regional integration. In the
post–Cold War era, the intense ideological and political competition
among nation-states subsided and was supplanted, to some extent, by
dialogues between new players regarding transnational integration.
Conversely, the end of the Cold War also brought bilateral political and
historical tensions to the surface, which had been suppressed under the
geopolitical rivalry between the First and the Second World War. The
tensions emerged from hyper-nationalism, territorial disputes, and the
Ltd., Inc, 2002), 182; Alexander Chandra, “The Role of Non-state Actors in
ASEAN,” in Revisiting Southeast Asian Regionalism, ed. Focus on the Global
South (Manila: Cor-Asia, Inc, 2006), 71–81. ASEAN’s most active knowledge
networks have been established in the field of forestry, such as the Regional
Knowledge Network on Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG
Network) established in October 2008 as well as the Regional Knowledge Network
on Forests and Climate Change. For more details, see Lorraine Elliott, “ASEAN
and Environmental Governance: Strategies of Regionalism in Southeast Asia,``
Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 12, No.3 (2012); Nicholas A. Robinson and
Koh Kheng-Lian, “Strengthening Sustainable Development in Regional
Inter-Governmental Governance: Lessons from the ‘ASEAN Way,’” Singapore
Journal of International and Comparative Law 6 (2002); Paruedee Nguitragool,
“Negotiation the Haze Treaty: Rationality and Institutions in the Negotiations for
the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution,” Asian Survey, Vol. 51,
No. 2 (2011).
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North Korea issue, among other causes. These conflicts interfered with the
opportunities for cooperation unleashed by the end of the Cold War and
greatly complicated the regional integration process.4 In spite of these
contradictory tendencies, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis served as a critical
juncture that called for collective mobilization in the region.5 East Asian
countries shared a feeling of resentment toward—and humiliation in the
face of—outside pressure, as well as the need to protect their distinctive
form of capitalism that differed from that of Europe or North America.6
Various Track II dialogues on Korean Peninsula issues among a commu-
nity of intellectuals, academics, and experts preceded the establishment of
formal intergovernmental organizations in the region and played an
instrumental role at the ideational level.7 For example, the East Asia Vision
Group was created in response to the proposal for a Northeast Asian
regional community by South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung in 1998,
which served as one of the region’s most extensive and comprehensive
nongovernmental processes and facilitated the establishment of the East
Asian Summit in 2005. East Asian community-building efforts were further
consolidated by the states and non-state actors that have responded to
North Korean nuclear proliferation for two decades and by the 2008
Global Financial Crisis.
Second, at the domestic level, democratization and industrialization
opened political opportunities whereby civil society organizations became
prominent sources of ideas and actors involved in regional
community-building. For the democratic countries of Japan and South
Korea, civil society has been an integral part of the democratization process
4Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of
Globalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
5Vinod K. Aggarwal, and Min Gyo Koo, ed. Asia’s New Institutional Architecture: Evolving
Structures for Managing Trade, Financial, and Security Relations (New York: Springer,
2008); Calder and Ye, The Making of Northeast Asia.
6Richard Higgot, “The Asian Economic Crisis: A Study in the Politics of Resentment,” New
Political Economy Vol. 3, No. 3 (2007); Paul Bowles, “Asia’s Post-crisis Regionalism: Bringing
the State Back In, Keeping the (United) States Out,” Review of International Political
Economy Vol. 9, No. 2 (2002); Richard Stubbs, “ASEAN Plus Three: Emerging East Asian
Regionalism?” Asian Survey Vol. 42, No. 3 (2002): 445.
7T. J. Pempel, ed., Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 2005).
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—raising public awareness and calling for government accountability
regarding critical social problems.8 In the authoritarian country of China,
social organizations exist as either professional associations or
government-organized NGOs, which express their views on social affairs
within highly regulated and constrained operational parameters set by the
party-state.9 China has, nevertheless, experienced an explosion of grass-
roots political activity.10 Regardless of regime type, successful economic
development of Northeast Asian countries depends on confronting com-
mon challenges with shared expertise and collective action. For example,
port cities—including China’s Dalian, South Korea’s Inchon, and Japan’s
Niigata—face risks from climate change, particularly from rising sea
levels.11 Other examples include energy insecurity, urban sprawl,
8Muthiah Alagappa, Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting
Democratic Space (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Sunhyuk Kim, The Politics
of Democratization in Korea (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Charles
Armstrong ed., Korean Civil Society: Civil Society, Democracy, and the State (New York: Taylor
& Francis, 2002); Robin M. LeBlanc, Bicycle Citizen: The Political World of the Japanese
Housewife (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1999); Kim
Reimann, “Building Global Civil Society from the Outside In? Japanese International
Development NGOs, the State, and International Norms,” in The State of Civil Society in
Japan, ed. Frank J. Schwartz and Susan J. Pharr (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003); Yasuo Takao, Reinventing Japan: From Merchant Nation to Civic Nation (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
9Fengshi Wu and Wen Bo, “Nongovernmental Organizations and Environmental Protests:
Impact in East Asia,” in Routledge Handbook of Environment and Society in Asia, eds. Graeme
Lang and Paul Harris, (Florence: Taylor and Francis, 2014); Fengshi Wu, “New Partners or
Old Brothers? GONGO in Transnational Environmental Advocacy in China,” in China
Environment Series 5, ed. Jennifer L. Turner (Washington, DC: ECSP, 2002).
10Kevin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li, Rightful Resistance in Rural China (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006); Elizabeth Perry and Merle Goldman, ed. Grassroots Political Reform
in Contemporary China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Peter Ho and
Richard Edmonds, ed. China’s Embedded Activism: Opportunities and Constraints of a Social
Movement (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).
11Peter Hayes and Richard Tanter, “Global Problems, Complexity, and Civil Society in East
Asia,” in Peter Hayes and Kiho Yi, ed. Complexity, Security, and Civil Society in East Asia
(Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2015).
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environmental degradation, migration, disaster management, and financial
vulnerability. These issues transect multiple states in the region and are
hard to tackle, let alone resolve, at the level of single countries. Due to their
agility and dense networks, non-state actors have unprecedented oppor-
tunities to both discuss regional affairs and propose specific solutions to
common challenges.
Lastly, if democratization and industrialization opened the door for
non-state actors to become an integral and indispensable part of regional
governance, the development of information technology and social media
has made the walls between borders porous and ushered in a remarkable
new era of information sharing. A combination of globalization, privati-
zation, and the Information Technology (IT) revolution enabled rapid
development in communication methods and the free flow of information,
which in turn allowed for the rise of transnational networking among
professionals and the narrowing of the gap between experts and the public.
One example of this last phenomenon comes from the Nautilus Institute
for Security and Sustainability, a nongovernmental policy-oriented research
and advocacy group. The institute launched an information network called
Nautilus Peace and Security Net (NAPSNet) in 1993, which covered key
areas of research and policy work including nuclear deterrence, energy
security, and climate change in the Asia-Pacific region. Through this
information network, people can share expertise, propose ideas to resolve
problems on the basis of shared scientific beliefs, and create and maintain
social institutions that respond to problems.12
Information technology has provided alternative sources of data that
cannot be found in the mass media or official propaganda of each country.
For example, since 2007, the American Embassy in Beijing started to
publish its PM2.5 Air Quality Index (AQI) on Twitter; since then, several
smartphone applications have made the data user-friendly, providing
an alternative to official data published by the Chinese Ministry of
12Peter Hayes, Wade Huntley, Tim Savage, and GeeGee Wong, “The Impact of the Northeast
Asian Peace and Security Network in US-DPRK Conflict Resolution” (paper presented at
Internet and International Systems: Information Technology and American Foreign Policy
Decision-making Workshop, Nautilus Institute, San Francisco, December 10, 1999).
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Environmental Protection.13 Another fascinating example of the Internet’s
ability to empower the public comes from “Safecast”—an international,
volunteer-driven organization that has provided radiation information to
the public following the 2011 Fukushima nuclear meltdown in Japan.
Safecast empowers the public by monitoring, gathering, and sharing
information on environmental radiation and other pollutants from
Fukushima and providing an alternative to government data. In South
Korea, Energy Justice Action has hosted live Internet broadcasts everyday
giving detailed accounts of the Fukushima incident to the public while also
providing information about South Korea’s own energy policy and nuclear
export strategy.14 Northeast Asian countries’ especially high Internet
penetration rates mean that both the public and civil society have an
inexpensive way to communicate with parties in and outside the region.15
As of 2014, 91% of the total population in Japan, 84% of the population in
South Korea, and 50% of the population in China has access to the
Internet, which provides an important foundation for potential
network-building efforts in the region.16
13These tweets on air quality can reach a growing audience via third-party smartphone apps
that have found a way to circumvent China’s blocking of Twitter. These apps include the
Beijing Air iPhone app (iphone.bjair.info) and the China Air Quality Index, which show the
official data released by China’s Ministry of Environmental Protection and data from the U.S.
Embassy. The apps also allow users to share images depicting current air quality and
screenshots with friends via social media platforms such as Weibo (a social networking alter-
native to the Facebook and Twitter, which are blocked in in China). Moreover, there are also
websites such as Beijing Air Pollution Real Time AQI, which presents air pollution data on
hundreds of cities across China in order to promote transparency regarding air quality data.
14See movie.energyjustice.kr; http://energyjustice.kr/zbxe/.
15Kenji Kushida and Seung-Youn Oh, “The Political Economies of Broadband Development
in Korea and Japan,” Asian Survey Vol. 47, No. 3 (2007).
16“Percentage of Population Using the Internet in Japan from 2000 to 2014,” last modified,
http://www.statista.com/statistics/255857/internet-penetration-in-japan/; “Percentage of
Population Using the Internet in South Korea from 2000 to 2014,” last modified, http://
www.statista.com/statistics/255859/internet-penetration-in-south-korea/; “Percentage of
Population Using the Internet in China from 2000 to 2014,” last modified, http://www.
statista.com/statistics/255136/internet-penetration-in-china/.
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Conceptualizing Multi-level Regional Community-Building Efforts
In Northeast Asia, policy areas that were once the indisputable domain of
state actors and formal public authorities have increasingly become part of a
shared “policy commons” due to the emergence of non-state actors and
the increasing complexity of the region’s economic and social problems.17
While states remain important participants in regional affairs, they are no
longer the only driving forces behind policy formation at the ideational and
operational levels. The boundaries between the state and society—as well
as those between the public and private sectors—have become blurred, and
efforts to build a regional framework are occurring in three distinct (if
overlapping) spheres.
In the first sphere, state-driven integration efforts have resulted in formal
government organizations such as ASEAN Plus Three, Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the East Asia
Summit. In the second sphere, a variety of informal “Track II” channels
foster conversation on economic, political, security, environmental, and
other transnational issues and have routinely brought together regional
leaders to lay down the groundwork for the creation of formal organiza-
tions. In this second layer of building a Northeast Asian regional frame-
work, “epistemic communities”—defined as networks of professionals with
recognized expertise in specific issue-areas and the authority to define their
policy goals—are also essential, as they develop shared principles, causal
beliefs, and social discourse and practices.18 The Boao Forum for Asia and
Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity, which are headquartered in China
and South Korea respectively, stand out as examples of the most extensive
and comprehensive transnational and multi-sectoral networking processes.
They were initiated by private actors (scholars and universities) in part-
nership with local governments and later went on to draw support from the
central government.19 They regularly convene leaders from the govern-
ment, businesses, and academia to exchange views informally with the goal
17Jon Pierre and B. Guy Peters, Governance, Politics, and the State (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2000), 4–5.
18Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination,” International Organization Vol. 46, No. 1 (1992).
19Kiho Yi et al., “The Implications of Civic Diplomacy for ROK Foreign Policy,” in Peter
Hayes and Kiho Yi ed., Complexity, Security, and Civil Society in East Asia (Cambridge: Open
Book Publishers, 2015).
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of expanding cooperation in various policy areas. Another example comes
from the framework of ASEAN Plus Three: The Network of Northeast
Asian Think-Tanks (NEAT), which generates new and creative regional
policy ideas on energy, telecommunications, and financial issues.
The third sphere is the realm of civil society, which consists of NGOs,
regional advocacy groups, and professional and business associations.
Non-governmental and non-profit in their orientation, civil society actors
share universally accepted norms and values which empowers them to forge
regional cooperation through major networks that incorporate state actors
as well as the general public. The depth of connections in non-state actors’
transnational coalitions and networks means these groups can share
high-quality information and often overcome barriers at the level of high
politics; moreover, these strong connections have allowed non-state actors
to expand their domain of activities, change local policies, and affect
regional politics. Actors in this third (civil society) sphere are especially
good at three things: (1) initiating discussions on sensitive issues and
generating transparency; (2) creating links with grassroots organizations,
mobilizing people, and organizing collective action; and (3) finding solu-
tions for complex problems. In sum, they can “fill structural ‘holes’
between other networks by spanning borders or boundaries, thereby cre-
ating networks of networks enabling other organizations to communicate
in ways otherwise thought impossible.”20 Non-state actors complement
the functions of the nation-state and create a feedback loop of knowledge
and regional integration that enhances Northeast Asia’s long-term eco-
nomic and political stability.
CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSNATIONAL COALITIONS AMONG
NON-STATE ACTORS IN NORTHEAST ASIA
Impact of State-society Relationships
Many comparative studies on East Asian regional integration have con-
firmed that the varying political systems and regulatory environments in
each country affect the way in which the state-society relationship develops,
which in turn impacts the framework through which non-state actors are
connected to other actors and the extent to which they are part of the
20Hayes and Tanter, Global Problems, Complexity, and Civil Society in East Asia, 76.
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policymaking process.21 The changing nature of state-society relationships
shapes transnational network-building among non-state actors in two
important areas: (1) their ability to reach a consensus on goals and policy
preferences, and (2) their ability to operate independently of state interest
and still have the potential to influence the policymaking process.
First, non-state actors need to reach a consensus on both shared
problems and policy choices before they can collectively mobilize their
financial and human resources. Since non-state actors operate under dif-
ferent political structures and developmental phases, this first step is often
challenging.22 For example, the air pollution and acid rain originating from
China’s rapid industrialization have been big concerns for both Japan and
South Korea, as they are located downwind from China. Their vulnerability
prompted various governmental and non-governmental actors to create
regional and sub-regional environmental frameworks and programs.23
Conversely, not only does the Chinese government often attempt to avoid
being regarded as a source country, but Chinese non-state actors tend to
concentrate on domestic environmental issues before addressing
cross-national concerns.24 As a result, Northeast Asian countries struggle
to find common ground on the pollution issue, identify specific countries’
responsibilities, and articulate conclusive scientific solutions, creates
obstacles to developing and implementing effective solutions. For example,
Japan, South Korea, and China voiced differences on air pollution and
deforestation during the meeting of the Northeast Asian Conference on
Environmental Cooperation in 2000. Consequently, the organization’s
21Wu and Bo, Nongovernmental Organizations and Environmental Protests: Impact in East
Asia; Miranda A. Schreurs, “Problems and Prospects for Regional Environmental
Cooperation in East Asia,” in Advancing East Asian Regionalism, ed. Melissa Curley and
Nicholas Thomas (New York: Routledge, 2006); Celeste Arrington and Sook-Jong Lee, The
Politics of NGOs and Democratic Governance in South Korea and Japan,” Pacific Focus,
2008: pp. 75–96.
22Hayes and Tanter, Global Problems, Complexity, and Civil Society in East Asia.
23Moreover, Japan and South Korea are both motivated by economic interests to sell envi-
ronmental technologies to China. Peter Hayes and Lyuba Zarsky, “Environmental Issues and
Regimes in East Asia,” Journal of International Affairs Vol. 6 (1995), 283.
24Yasumasa Komori, “Evaluating Regional Environmental Governance in Northeast Asia,”
Asian Affairs: An American Review Vol. 37, No. 1 (2010).
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proposed Core Fund did not materialize and the original plan for joint
research projects could not be implemented.25
Second, the extent to which non-state actors can operate independently
significantly affects the nature of their mobilization. Without such auton-
omy, their proposals will mirror domestic political priorities or be driven by
state preferences. Northeast Asian countries are known as “strong states”
with hierarchical state-society relationships (in spite of whether they are
democratic or non-democratic). In identifying “network-style integra-
tion,” Peter Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi deliberately paid little
attention to non-state actors outside of the market and instead noted how
hierarchic state-society relationships stunted the development of horizontal
and associational communities in the region.26 Although they are still
considered to be state-centered rather than society-centered, both Japan
and South Korea have gradually developed into “embedded states” by
strengthening the liberal nature of the state’s relationships with other social
actors through economic and political liberalization.27 The Chinese sys-
tem, meanwhile, is characterized by party-state dominance, where the state
exerts significant control over the activities of societal associations. There
has been a notable increase in the number of NGOs in China since the late
1990s, but their activities remain highly regulated and operate within the
parameters set by the government. In addition, an increasing number of
these NGOs are becoming so-called government-organized NGOs
(GONGOs), which are coopted into the system and constrained from
autonomous social actions.28 Their agenda and activities are shaped,
25Whasun Jho and Hyunju Lee. “The Structure and Political Dynamics of Regulating “Yellow
Sand” in Northeast Asia,” Asian Perspective Vol. 33, No. 2(2009).
26Katzenstein and Shiraishi.
27Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995); Chung-In Moon and Rashmi Prasad, “Networks, Politics,
and Institutions,” in Beyond the Developmental State: East Asia’s Political Economies
Reconsidered, ed. Steven Chan et al. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998).
28Jessica C. Teets, Civil Society Under Authoritarianism (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2014); Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, The Political Economy of Regionalism in East Asia:
Integrative Explanation for Dynamics and Challenges (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008); Fengshi Wu, “New Partners or Old Brothers?”.
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affected, and guided by government authorities at the central and regional
levels. Civil-society actors also often make conscious decisions not to use
strategies that mobilize collective resistance due to daunting political
pressure, the high prevalence of surveillance, and the hidden constraints
they endure on a daily basis.29 Overall, the state-society relationship not
only affects the types, viability, and effectiveness of non-state actor coali-
tions, but also critically depends on the contours of domestic politics.30
Additionally, the government’s attitude toward public pressure can
affect the opportunity structures non-state actor movements encounter and
can shift the balance in state-society relationships.31 When the ruling party
is more willing and able to respond to public demands, non-state actors
encounter fewer hurdles to accessing the policy-making arena. When the
ruling party is more resistant to public demands, however, non-state actors
can still overcome barriers created by domestic political structures by
obtaining project funding and greater visibility through transnational
networks; regional non-state actors tend to have more success in advancing
these goals when international organizations prioritize a certain agenda as a
critical global political issue.32 Non-state actors can further influence the
direction of domestic policy through external pressure imposed on the
central government—the so-called boomerang effect. This will be
demonstrated in the case study section through the examples of how the
29Fengshi Wu and Kinman Chan, “Graduated Control and Beyond: The Evolving
Governance over Social Organizations in China,” China Perspectives Vol. 3 (2012); In China,
there has been a clear disconnect between NGO-centered advocacy and mass-based protests.
30Miranda A. Schreurs, “Problems and Prospects for Regional Environmental Cooperation in
East Asia,” in Advancing East Asian Regionalism, ed. Melissa Curley and Nicholas Thomas
(New York: Routledge, 2006).
31Mary Alice Haddad, “Paradoxes of Democratization: Environmental Politics in East Asia,”
in Routledge Handbook of Environment and Society in Asia, ed. Paul Harris and Graeme Lang
(New York: Routledge, 2014).
32Thomas Risse-Kappen et al, Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors,
Domestic Structures, and International Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1995).
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transnational anti-nuclear movement affected domestic nuclear power plant
development in Taiwan and other East Asian countries.33
Patterns of Cross-National Coalition-Building
Caught between their aspirations for building multilateral cooperation and
constraining political realities, transnational coalitions among non-state
actors in Northeast Asia have developed two main characteristics:
(1) greater focus on non-traditional than traditional security issues and
(2) more bilateral than multilateral forms of collaboration. First, transna-
tional networks among non-state actors are more likely to emerge around
non-traditional security issues where the interests of international organi-
zations, nation-states, and non-governmental actors converge—such as the
environment, human trafficking, disaster relief, and other developmental
challenges. Although traditional security issues such as territorial disputes
or nuclear proliferation are dominated by nation-state actors and compli-
cated by national interests, non-traditional security areas allow actors with
various interests to reach agreements regarding the sources of problems,
potential solutions, and policy preferences due to the transnationally shared
nature of the issues. The universality of norms and values underlying
human security issues, for example, resonate powerfully in the minds of the
general public. Moreover, non-traditional security issue areas often moti-
vate state actors to ask for technical and logistical support from non-state
actors including academics, experts, and “soft elites” (that is, networks of
like-minded government officials who often act in a civilian capacity). This
kind of a specific issue-focused network can be a double-edged sword,
however. Without a central entity acting as a hub to manage various
cross-national participants, cross-national networks can be short-term
33Examples of this are commonly seen in Southeast Asia, where foreign governments and
development banks support NGO projects and empower them to foster democratization and
influence national policy concerning environmental protection and biodiversity. In Indonesia,
the U.S. Agency for International Development created a trust fund to provide long-term
support for Indonesian NGOs working on biodiversity issues that include politically sensitive
issues as land reform, government transparency, and forest management. For details, see
Laura B. Campbell, “The Political Economy of Environmental Regionalism in Asia,” in
Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region, ed. T. J. Pempel (Ithaca and London:
Cornell University Press, 2005).
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phenomena that fade away once a specific issue is tackled or because
transaction costs increase to unsupportable levels due to overlapping pro-
jects and minimal coordination.
Another characteristic of non-state actor cooperation in Northeast Asia
is the predominance of bilateral initiatives over multilateral ones. Unlike
official top-level meetings, discussions of regional initiatives among
non-state actors tend to be event-based and location-specific. A non-state
network often begins with a certain group’s experience in one country, and
then expands to bilateral coordination that includes actors at various
cross-national levels, rather than starting out on a multilateral basis.
Depending on the level of accountability, institutionalization, and orga-
nizational strength, the shape of the transnational coordination and col-
laboration takes one of two different forms: networks or coalitions.
Networks involve spontaneous and functional processes, often serving as a
prelude to coalition-building over time. Coalitions, meanwhile, are tightly
coordinated and dense organizational networks with more clearly defined
agendas for joint actions and more commonly shared goals. Effective
network- and coalition-building can improve efficiency by allowing orga-
nizations to address multifaceted issues that are larger than any one of their
particular missions and achieve a broader purpose than could be accom-
plished by any single organization. Coalition-building also reduces dupli-
cation of efforts and costs, minimizes unhelpful competition, and magnifies
issue visibility.34
Japanese or South Korean civil-society actors tend to initiate mostly
bilateral collaborations, while Chinese civil-society actors are usually
incorporated at some point later in the process. Japan occupies a unique
position in the region as a highly industrialized country that contributes to
regional development through its Official Development Assistance (ODA).
Prefectural and municipal governments serve as important initiators and
constituencies of ODA projects, and local NGOs actively participate as
well. Such networks of collaboration complement the Japanese central
government’s intention of using the ODA as a channel for diplomacy.
Chinese NGOs and social actors may not initiate transnational collabora-
tion, but they are important participants at the operational level. Unlike the
limited role played by NGOs, however, sub-national Chinese governments
34Helen Yanacopulos, “The strategies that bind: NGO coalitions and their influence,” Global
Networks, 5 (2005).
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maintain relatively strong autonomy at the local level so they can build
inter-city networks by bypassing Beijing’s control and opening up oppor-
tunity structures for non-state actor coalitions to penetrate into China, as
will be discussed in the following case study section.
OVERVIEW OF EMERGING ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISMS
IN NORTHEAST ASIA
A number of factors have motivated Northeast Asian states to make the
“3Es” of economic growth, environment protection, and energy
security-shared regional priorities. Geographic proximity makes Northeast
Asian countries environmentally interdependent, and the region’s heavy
dependence on imported fossil fuels makes energy security a matter of
survival. Increasing public outcry over pollution and resultant health
problems has also challenged political legitimacy and sustainable economic
development. Environmental activism has been an integral part of demo-
cratic transition in Japan since the 1960s and in South Korea since the
1980s; recently, even non-democratic China has faced increasing levels of
environment-related protests and litigation.35 Internationally shared norms
on environmental protection and countries’ desire to develop alternative
energy sources as a zero-carbon alternative to fossil fuels give non-state
actors the opportunity to forge region-wide initiatives. This section reviews
two major ways in which non-state actors operate in Northeast Asia:
(1) providing substantive support to state actors and (2) providing alter-
native policy options that work against states’ interests.
Case Study Part 1: Collaborative Work at the Multilateral Level
Intergovernmental environmental cooperation in Northeast Asia is largely
a product of the 1990s post–Cold War era.36 The 1992 United Nations
35In both 2014 and 2015, the Chinese population’s top concern has been the environment.
“Corruption, Pollution, Inequality Are Top Concerns in China,” last modified September 24,
2015, http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/09/24/corruption-pollution-inequality-are-top-
concerns-in-china/.
36Yasumasa Komori, “Evaluating Regional Environmental Governance in Northeast Asia,”
Asian Affairs: An American Review Vol. 37, No. 1 (2010); Hayes and Zarsky,
“Environmental Issues and Regimes in Northeast Asia,” 283 et passim.
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Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, also known as
the Rio Earth Summit) was the major catalyst that prompted Northeast
Asian governments to create regional and sub-regional frameworks for
environmental cooperation. The Environment Congress for Asia and the
Pacific (ECO-ASIA) launched in 1991 encompasses the broader
Asia-Pacific region, while three other collaborative forums have been
established specific to Northeast Asia region—the Northeast Asian
Conference on Environmental Cooperation (NEAC) in 1992, the
North-East Asia Subregional Program for Environmental Cooperation
(NEASPEC) in 1993, and the Tripartite Environment Ministers Meeting
(TEMM) in 1999.37
Along with these processes, networks among non-state actors such as
local governments and civil society networks play a critical role at the
ideational and operational levels by convening and supporting epistemic
communities that share an understanding of sustainability problems in each
country. For instance, TEMM gave funds to the Korean Federation for
Environmental Movements (KFEM), a national-level NGO coalition
started in 1993, to coordinate nongovernmental cooperation across bor-
ders.38 KFEM has become the largest environmental NGO in Asia, with
over fifty local branches across the country and 150,000 registered mem-
bers as of 2014. It worked with bird-watching groups in Japan, Taiwan,
and Hong Kong to form the Northeast Asia Black-faced Spoonbill
Network to promote information exchange and coordinate conservation
efforts in 1996. In 2002, KFEM became the Korean chapter of the
37Some issue-specific programs have also been established. In 1994, China, Japan, South
Korea, and Russia adopted the Action Plan for the Protection, Management, and
Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the Northwest Pacific Region
(NOWPAP) to manage the coastal and marine environment in the Yellow Sea and the East
Sea/Sea of Japan. In 2001, the Acid Deposition Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET)
was formally established after several years of preparatory negotiations. More recently, some
projects to address the problem of dust and sandstorms (DSS) have also been launched.
Recently established transnational organizations include the regional dust technical support
plan (DSS-RETA), the Yellow Sea Large Marine Ecosystem Strategic Action Project
(YSLME), and remote air pollution in Northeast Asia joint research (LTP).
38Wu and Bo, Nongovernmental Organizations and Environmental Protests: Impact in East
Asia, 105–19.
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international environmental federation, Friends of the Earth, and has since
been visible on the stage of global environmental politics.
Local governments also serve as a critical component of cross-border,
inter-city network-building with their counterparts at the sub-national
level. Located strategically between central governments and local civil
society organizations, they can develop projects without being interrupted
by political agendas at the central government level and provide necessary
resources and a degree of accountability to civil society organizations
within given local boundaries.39 The Japanese city of Kitakyushu’s close
collaboration with the Chinese city of Dalian on establishing an environ-
mental model zone offers a fascinating example. Kitakyushu, in the
Japanese state of Fukuoka, once had a notorious reputation as a highly
polluted industrial area, but it is now known as a leader in industrial pol-
lution control and the movement toward a zero-emission society.40 The
local government of Kitakyushu proposed the creation of a Dalian
Environmental Model Zone as a pilot project when Chinese State
Councilor Song Jian visited the city in December 1993, while persuading
the Japanese central government to make the plan an ODA-funded pro-
ject.41 From December 1996 to March 2000, the Kitakyushu government
collaborated closely with Dalian in sharing expertise on technology,
administrative operations, city planning, and transferring the requisite
pollution control technology and management practices.42 This subna-
tional network’s ability to bypass Tokyo and Beijing allowed the project to
develop quickly without being interrupted by political agendas at the
central government level. Notably, both governments brought otherwise
unconnected actors together—such as engineers, environmental experts,
city officials, local businesses, and grassroots groups. The Kitakyushu
39Schreurs, “Problems and Prospects for Regional Environmental Cooperation in East Asia,”
2006.
40“From a ‘Gray City’ to a ‘Green City,’” last modified 2015, https://www.city.kitakyushu.
lg.jp/english/file_0064.html.
41“From a ‘Gray City’ to a ‘Green City’”; “Official Development Assistance (ODA): 8. Efforts
in Environmental Conservation,” last modified, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/
summary/1998/8.html.
42Hayes and Tanter, Global Problems, Complexity, and Civil Society in East Asia; Yasuo Takao,
Reinventing Japan: From Merchant Nation to Civic Nation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2007).
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Initiative for a Clean Environment was adopted at the United Nations
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Meeting
(UNESCAP) in September 2000, and the Kitakyushu Initiative Network
was founded in 2001 to promote regional cooperation among cities
regarding environmental cleanup information.43 By January 2010, more
than sixty-two cities from eighteen countries in the Asia Pacific Region had
joined the network, exchanged information, and carried out pilot pro-
jects.44 rean cities of Cheongju, Daegu, Jeju, Jeonju, and Pohang.
Subnational cooperation between the cities of Hiroshima, Japan, and
Chongqing, China, serves as another example.45 Participants included the
five Ko These two cities signed a friendship agreement in 1986 and began
environmental cooperation in 1990 through which Hiroshima dispatched
technical advisors and trained personnel to Chongqing. This inter-city
network expanded to the higher state-government level between
Hiroshima prefecture and Sichuan province, creating the Sichuan Province
Joint Environmental Protection Project in 1993. Environmental cooper-
ation between Japan and South Korea is not at the level of Japan-China
cooperation in terms of quality or volume. The reason for this gap is that
yen loans and grant aid from Japan to South Korea recently stopped
because the latter’s economy has graduated from the stage that requires
foreign assistance. Nevertheless, there is a trend toward environmental
cooperation between Japan and South Korea through cross-border
developmental zones.
Transnational social and economic ties among local authorities in
Northeast Asian countries go beyond environmental collaboration—in-
cluding in the steadily deepening ties among geographically proximate
localities surrounding the Pan-Yellow Sea (or East China Sea). In this
region, grassroots-level economic integration has taken place in the form of
cross-border developmental zones such as the Tumen River Development
Area, the Japan Sea Rim Economic Zone, and the Bohai-Yellow Sea Rim
Development Project. Local governments have made extensive efforts in
43“Kitakyushu Initiative for a Clean Environment,” last modified, http://kitakyushu.iges.or.
jp/.
44Toshizo Maeda et al., “Kitakyushu Initiative for a Clean Environment FINAL REPORT,”
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, 2010.
45Nicholas Thomas, Governance and Regionalism in Asia (New York: Routledge, 2009).
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creating sister-city and friendship-city relationships since the 1990s.46 In
2003, there were 266 sister-city relationships between China and Japan. By
2005, that number had jumped by nearly 20% to 313—notwithstanding
the much-publicized national-level tensions over Japan’s World War II
Yasukuni Shrine.47 In 2016, Japan had the world’s most sister-city linkages
with China with 214, while South Korea ranked third with 125.48
Such inter-city networks in Northeast Asia have fueled the discussion
on expanding inter-urban networks to include the largest cities and
regions in China, Japan, and South Korea. In 1991, the BeSeTo
(Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo) cooperation initiative gained international recog-
nition, followed by mayors of the three cities signing a memorandum of
cooperation in 1995.49 Even though the formal BeSeTo initiative remains
in the planning stages, initiatives launched by the three cities themselves
have provided specific ideas on how to face shared developmental chal-
lenges such as urbanization and rapid industrialization. In 2007, a
three-year review among Japan’s National Institute for Research
Advancement, the Korean Research Institute for Human Settlements, and
China’s National Development and Reform Commission produced “The
Joint Proposal for Promotion of the Realization of the BeSeTo Corridor
Vision—Toward Sustained Development in the Northeast Asia Region.”50
The report suggests establishing transportation and knowledge corridors as
well as information highways across Northeast Asian cities. Other proposals
include promoting inter-city urban corridor development over the
Shenyang-Yanbian section of the BeSeTo corridor (within China), the
Nampo-Pyongyang section (within North Korea), and the Incheon-Seoul
section (within South Korea). Despite frequent national-level tensions in
Northeast Asia, local governments have collaborated toward achieving
46K-H. Yang, “International Cooperation of Local Governments among Northeast Asia,
Especially Focused on Maritime Networks.” Paper prepared in proceeding of OECD-MLTM
Joint Seminar during the OECD Study Mission to Seoul, Gwacheon, Korea, October 2008.
47Calder and Ye, The Making of Northeast Asia.
48“List of Countries with sister-city relationship with China” http://www.cifca.org.cn/Web/
WordGuanXiBiao.aspx.
49Hieyeon Keum, “Globalization and Inter-City Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” East Asia
Vol. 18, No. 2 (2000).
50Hayes and Tanter, Global Problems, Complexity, and Civil Society in East Asia.
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certain shared goals. Globalization and liberalization has certainly increased
the role of cities as agents of cross-national cooperation and the exchange
of capital, labor, information, and technology.
Case Study Part 2: An Alternative Outlet in the Competition with State
Actors and Multinational Companies
Nuclear power plants and nuclear waste present serious challenges to
Northeast Asia’s environment and its energy policies. With the combina-
tion of increased national competition for oil and gas among fast-growing
Asian nations and the negative environmental impact of carbon emissions,
many states in the region view nuclear power as a matter of survival, both in
terms of meeting growing energy demands and promoting environmental
security. Government plans to designate permanent nuclear plants or waste
repositories often face considerable (and sometimes violent) domestic and
regional opposition. Debates over nuclear power policies and programs in
Northeast Asia and worldwide reached a fever pitch following the “Triple
Disaster” of March 2011—when the northeast region of Japan suffered
from a devastating 9.0 magnitude earthquake and massive tsunami waves
up to 41 meters that took the lives of nearly 20,000 people, and the
subsequent nuclear meltdown of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors. Even
after this disaster, however, Northeast Asia continues to rely heavily on
nuclear energy. As of January 2016, China has the world’s largest nuclear
energy program, with thirty existing nuclear reactors, twenty-four reactors
under construction, and a firm commitment to build forty more reactors in
the future. Taiwan has six operating nuclear reactors and two advanced
reactors that were under construction, but are now suspended. South
Korea has twenty-four nuclear reactors that produce 30% of the country’s
electricity and plans to make that percentage reach 70% by 2029.
Additionally, South Korea wants to export its nuclear technology to
countries including Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia—
with a goal of selling eighty reactors worth $400 billion by 2030.51
While governments and leading power companies look for ways to
endorse the benefits of nuclear energy, anti-nuclear organizations and
51“World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements,” last modified January 1, 2016,
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Facts-and-Figures/World-Nuclear-Power-Reactors-
and-Uranium-Requirements/.
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residents from potentially affected local communities have organized
counter-movements both domestically and cross-regionally. The No
Nukes Asia Forum (NNAF) represents the most extensive and substantial
effort—an Asia-wide civil society network striving for military and civil
denuclearization in Asia.52 In 1992, NNAF was created by South Korean
antinuclear activist Won-Shik Kim, along with the support of 1354 indi-
viduals, 177 organizations, and a steering committee of 100 members.53
Since then, NNAF has provided a platform for many participants from
various Asian countries to engage in publishing relevant information and
campaigning for alternative policy options to resolve nuclear power issues.
The NNAF not only disseminates alternative information transnationally
to counter pro-nuclear government propaganda, but it also organizes
“counter-conferences” to pro-nuclear gatherings. Japanese government
officials and companies have taken the lead in promoting nuclear power
plants in neighboring countries by organizing various conferences and
inviting engineers from Asian countries to study the Japanese experience.
In October 1996, the Japanese city of Kobe hosted the 10th Pacific Basin
Nuclear Conference, which was jointly sponsored by the Atomic Energy
Society of Japan and the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, under the aus-
pices of the American Nuclear Society and the Pacific Nuclear Council. As
a forum among nuclear societies and associations from around the Pacific
Rim, this conference included workshops and fieldtrips that advanced the
uses of nuclear energy and promoted the construction of nuclear power
plants in the region. In response, the Japanese committee of the NNAF
organized the “Pacific Basin No Nukes Conference” during the same
month in Kobe to provide a venue for anti-nuclear discussion.54 In March
2012, the NNAF organized another anti-nuclear conference in Seoul,
South Korea, to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the Fukushima
disaster. This took place one week prior to the 2012 Nuclear Security
Summit in Seoul, which hosted 58 world leaders from 53 states, as well as
52“No Nukes Asia Forum Japan,” http://www.nonukesasiaforum.org/jp/index-e.htm.
53“No Nukes Asia Forum Korea,” http://nnafkr.blogspot.com/2012/02/history.html.
54“Asia: Nuclear Industry, Opponents Meet in Kobe,” last modified November 13, 1996,
http://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/461/asia-nuclear-industry-opponents-
meet-kobe.
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international organizations such as the United Nations and the
International Atomic Energy Agency. “Counter-conferences” help NNAF
raise public awareness and influence political discourse, as the NNAF
concludes these conferences by issuing action plans on each country’s
nuclear development status and making joint statements on regional
developments, such as Japan’s plan to export reactors to Indonesia and
China, and Japan and North Korea’s plans to produce plutonium.
Second, the NNAF provides a platform for connecting activists from
Asian nations to coordinate campaigns against existing and planned nuclear
power plant sites. NNAF’s responses to Indonesian and Taiwanese nuclear
development programs offer great examples. Indonesia’s Nuclear Power
Act in 1997 and BATAN (Badan Tenaga Nuklir Nasional, or National
Nuclear Energy Agency) faced dynamic resistance from districts that were
suggested as potential sites for nuclear power plants. One of the most
notable instances of resistance came from the Jepara District of Central
Java, where broad-based civil society actors were empowered through their
trans-national networking with NNAF.55 The Japanese anti-nuclear
advocacy group known as the Muri-Muri Campaign Committee spon-
sored the visit by two Indonesians (Nuruddin Amin, a local leader in the
Islamic organization Nahdlatul Ulama, and Nur Hidayati, a climate and
energy campaigner for Greenpeace South-East Asia) to Japan and South
Korea in July 2007 to tell representatives of both governments not to
support Indonesia’s nuclear power plans.56 In Japan, the two Indonesian
representatives met with the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry,
55Achmad Uzair Fauzan and Jim Schiller, “After Fukushima: The Rise of Resistance to
Nuclear Energy in Indonesia,” German Asia Foundation (2011).
56The “Muri-Mur” Committee is comprised of No Nukes Asia Forum Japan, Friends of the
Earth Japan, Citizens’Nuclear Information Center, Japan Congress Against A- and H-Bombs,
Greenpeace Japan, and NINDJA (Network for Indonesian Democracy, Japan). For more
details, see “Indonesian Anti-Nuclear Activists DeliverMessages to Japanese Government,” last
modified July 5, 2007, http://www.cnic.jp/english/topics/
international/murijul07/murimr5jul07.html.
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and Hitachi, the main nuclear power plant maker in Japan.57 In South
Korea, Nuruddin Amin held a one-person protest in front of the Korean
Electric Power Company to bring attention to the involvement of its
subsidiary group, Korean Hydro Nuclear Power, in Jepara’s proposed
nuclear power plant.58 On another occasion, the NNAF invited seven Thai
citizens to the 2011 NNAF Annual Forum (three local villagers from
proposed sites of nuclear power plants, one anti-nuclear activist, and three
journalists) six months after the Fukushima nuclear crisis. In tandem with
the World Conference against A and H Bombs, these Thais learned about
the Japanese experience after the Fukushima disaster while also sharing
concerns about Thailand’s power development plans with other
participants.59
Such cross-national anti-nuclear advocacy efforts can lead to actual
policy changes. Even though efforts by anti-nuclear groups to halt the
construction of the fourth nuclear power plant in Taiwan in the late 1990s
initially failed, anti-nuclear activists gained new momentum as a result of
the NNAF pressuring the country’s new Democratic Progressive Party
(DPP) president, Chen Shui-bian, to honor the party’s anti-nuclear stance
following the 2000 election. NNAF not only supported a march in Taipei
in May 2000 that mobilized around 2000 demonstrators, but it also
organized a trip for Japanese city councilors from Kashiwazaki City—a
metropolis with the same type of nuclear reactors as Taiwan—to the site of
57METI officials took the attitude that responsibility for the project rests entirely with the
Indonesian government. They acknowledged no responsibility in regard to the safety of any
plant constructed by Japanese companies in Indonesia and said that Japanese law does not
include safety requirements for exports of nuclear power plants. Nor did they acknowledge any
obligation to consider the wishes of the local population. On the other hand, JBIC’s envi-
ronmental and social guidelines place importance on the participation of stakeholders,
including local residents and local NGOs affected by the project. Toshiba and Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries refused to meet the Indonesian visitors.
58Fauzan and Schiller.
59The Heinrich Boll Stiftung Southeast Asia Regional Office (German think tank for Green
projects) sponsored the Thai participants. See “No Nukes Asia Forum: Lessons from
Fukushima Daiichi for Thailand,” last modified October 11, 2011, https://www.boell.de/
en/ecology/climate-energy-no-nukes-asia-forum-2011-13030.html.
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Taiwan’s proposed nuclear power plant.60 The Japanese delegation and
NNAF activists expressed concerns about the safety of the proposed
reactor, threats to Taiwan’s nuclear power plants from frequent earth-
quakes, and the Taiwan Power Corporation’s crisis-management abilities.
The combined efforts of domestic and international actors finally led
President Chen to order the Ministry of Economic Affairs to appoint a
committee to re-evaluate the project and ultimately halt construction of
Taiwan’s fourth nuclear power plant in October 2000.61
In South Korea, President Lee Myung-bak championed a green growth
framework that provided a new justification for the country to expand
nuclear power at home and pursue export opportunities. In December
2009, a South Korean consortium led by Korea Electric Power Company
won a US $20 billion contract to build four civil nuclear reactors in the
United Arab Emirates, prevailing over competitors from Japan’s Hitachi
and France’s Areva. In tandem with this development, the South Korean
government announced plans to draw more than 50% of the country’s
domestic energy needs from the nuclear sector by 2020. After the gov-
ernment’s announcement, the Korean Federation for Environmental
Movements, an organization with years of experience in anti-nuclear
campaigning, began coordinating with the NNAF to gather international
support for a campaign against the government’s plans. As for China, even
though the country’s anti-nuclear activists have not accepted invitations
from NNAF to join the network, it will be interesting to see what the
future holds as the Chinese government and state-owned enterprises
aggressively attempt to expand the country’s nuclear power plants.62
60“Nuclear Plant Activists Get Support from Japan,” last modified May 18, 2000, http://
www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/05/18/0000036473.
61Shu-Hsiang Hsu, “Advocacy Coalitions and Policy Change on Nuclear Power Utilization in
Taiwan,” The Social Science Journal Vol. 42, No. 2 (2005).
62“DEWA awards first clean coal power plant “Hassyan” in the Middle East to consortium
led by HEI and ACWA Power,” http://acwapower.com/news-home-page/dewa-awards-
first-clean-coal-power-plant-hassyan-in-the-middle-east-to-consortium-led-by-hei-and-acwa-
power/.
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SHADOW OF THE PAST: FORCES INHIBITING NORTHEAST
ASIAN COMMUNITY-BUILDING
Although transnational coalitions and networks have been on the rise in
Northeast Asia, resurgent nationalism stemming from collective memories
of a contentious past helps explain the persistence of hostility and mistrust
within the region. As Chung-In Moon and Seung-won Suh suggest,
healing the pain of the past and creating a positive shared memory are a
vital part of fostering shared values and common goals for regional
community-building.63 However, politicians and leaders throughout
Northeast Asia often manipulate history for domestic political gains or
increased diplomatic leverage. Individual countries’ strong political and
economic achievements reinforce their populations’ sense of national pride,
distinctive identity, territorial integrity, and historical sovereignty, thereby
providing a political justification for assertive nationalist moves.64 The
Japanese legislature, for example, has changed the country’s history text-
book standards, facilitating the whitewashing of military atrocities in World
War II and evoking a strong nationalist response from both in Japan and in
neighboring countries. This creates a vicious cycle of worsening diplomatic
ties and deteriorating perceptions of Japan among the publics in South
Korea and China—which, in turn, further stokes Japanese neo-nationalism.
Renewed island disputes—between Japan and South Korea regarding
Takeshima/Dokdo in the Sea of Japan/East Sea and between Japan and
China regarding Senkaku/Diaoyudao in the East China Sea—have further
hurt the efforts to build the trust needed for regional community-building.
Despite being on the same side when it comes to the issue of Japan’s
colonial history, China and South Korea have had their own dispute over
history since 2003, when China’s Northeast Project (Dongbeni
Gongcheng/Dongbook Gongjeong) claimed that Korea’s ancient king-
dom of Goguryeo was a peripheral local government in the Chinese
Empire. Moreover, ultra-nationalists in Japan, China, and South Korea all
63Chung-In Moon and Seung-won Suh, “Burdens of the Past: Overcoming History, the
Politics of Identity and Nationalism in Asia,” Global Asia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2007).
64Chung-In Moon and Chun-fu Li, “Reactive Nationalism and South Korea’s Foreign Policy
on China and Japan: A Comparative Analysis,” Pacific Focus Vol. 25 (2010).
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use social media to form adversarial networks and coalitions, which negate
regional community-building efforts.
Nevertheless, the sub-national network that is seeking to forge a positive
shared memory among Japan, South Korea, and China has been
strengthened in recent years. The best example of this trend comes from
the Committee for Common History Teaching Materials of the Three
Countries’ May 2005 publication of A History to Open the Future. This
landmark history textbook is a successful counter to the 2001 Japanese
Ministry of Education–approved revisionist textbook, which denied the
forced sexual slavery of Korean comfort women in World War II and the
occurrence of the Nanjing Massacre in 1937.65 A History to Open the
Future focuses on building a more comprehensive understanding of history
among the three countries, including their more positive contemporary
relationships. The book covers the period ranging from the Japanese
occupation of its neighbors, the Pacific War in World War II, the Korean
War, the Cold War, up until the recent normalizations of diplomatic
relations among these three countries.66
This book is the result of longstanding efforts among non-state actors,
which began in 1992 when universities from the three countries gathered
in Yokohama to call for a joint review of history textbooks. The initiative
developed into the Joint Japanese-Korean Organization of Historical
Research in 2001 with the visionary (and labor-intensive) work by a tri-
lateral history writing committee of fifty-three members, most of whom are
academics (seventeen from China, thirteen from Japan, and twenty-three
from South Korea).67 Written in Japanese, Korean, and Chinese, this book
was not only widely read in all three countries (with over quarter of a
million sales by 2006), but also inspired sister-city campaigns involving
twenty South Korean civic groups and fourteen Japanese groups in 2004
and 2005 to pressure Japanese education officials into refusing the Japanese
65Hayes and Yi, Complexity, Security, and Civil Society in East Asia; Hayes and Yi, The
Implications of Civic Diplomacy for ROK Foreign Policy.
66Lionel Babicz, “South Korea, Japan, and China: In Search of a Shared Historical
Awareness,” paper presented at the 6th Biennial Conference of the Korean Studies Association
of Australasia, Sydney, University of Sydney, 2009.
67Zheng Wang, “Old Wounds, New Narratives: Joint History Textbook Writing and
Peacebuilding in East Asia,” History and Memory Vol. 21, No. 1 (2009).
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Ministry of Education–approved New History Textbook.68 Despite the
difficulty posed by divided memories at the nation-state level, these rapidly
evolving networks of non-state actors serve a visionary role in producing an
alternative shared history based on mutual research and dialogue. Such
subnational ties among non-state actors have often intensified and carried
out meaningful underground work precisely because of, not in spite of,
political uncertainties found at the nation-state level. This is how non-state
actors slowly create a space for greater citizen participation in regional
politics and add resilience to regional cooperation.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: NORTHEAST ASIAN
COMMUNITY-BUILDING BEYOND THE ELITE LEVEL
This chapter assesses the role of non-state actors in the process of re-
gionalization and the potential of community-building in Northeast Asia,
with a focus on the three main Northeast Asian countries of Japan, South
Korea, and China. As author Peter Hayes aptly points out, Northeast Asia
is “more of an anti-region than a community”—a place where varying
interests, strategies, goals, political constraints, and stages of economic
development have made regional cooperation, and institutionalization of
such efforts, daunting.69 As discussed in other chapters from this volume,
Northeast Asian societies’ inability to overcome negative collective mem-
ories from the region’s recent past has made state-led integration efforts
more difficult. Non-state actors may not be able to change the fundamental
distribution of power and resolve the tensions found in “high” politics. Yet
it is increasingly clear that non-state actors in Northeast Asia have become
an important force in regional community-building as ideational con-
stituencies, operational partners, and constructive challengers to state
actors.
In the face of various challenges in state-to-state relations, examining
non-state actors’ role in building a regional framework in Northeast Asia is
both a normative and practical endeavor. Regional community-building
efforts often take hybrid forms that blur the distinction between govern-
mental and non-governmental. Thus, it is vital to identify sources of
regional cooperation from a multilayered perspective and make the most of
68Hayes and Yi, Complexity, Security, and Civil Society in East Asia.
69Hayes and Tanter, Global Problems, Complexity, and Civil Society in East Asia, 36.
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how local governments, corporations, non-governmental organizations,
policy networks, and epistemic linkages supportive of regional cooperation
in Northeast Asia have all worked to move past the distrust caused by
intermittent historical controversies. These kinds of strengthened networks
and collaborations can go beyond the operational level of creating com-
mon knowledge by also inspiring a common vision and a shared discourse
of the future at the ideational level. Indeed, Northeast Asia has evolved into
a more coherent, identifiable and tightly knit entity than was true before
the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. Moreover, as my various case studies
demonstrated, non-state actors lend credibility to ongoing regional inte-
gration efforts because of political uncertainties at the state-to-state level;
they drive the quiet transformation from the bottom that will bring the
region closer to making the elusive dream of East Asian
community-building a reality.
THE TRUMP FACTOR
A combination of global integration and economic liberalization has
opened a window of opportunity for the emergence of transnational net-
works among non-state actors in East Asia. Yet, Donald Trump’s election
to the presidency of the United States has given renewed urgency to the
very question of the benefits of global and regional integration. His victory,
coming on the heels of Brexit, reflects the rising tide of populist political
parties and assertive nationalism around the world. It is yet too early to
figure out the contours of his foreign policy for East Asia, but regional
anxieties are surely on the rise. Trump’s “America First” worldview has
challenged the system of alliances, rules, and norms that have underpinned
the United States’ leadership of the post-war liberal world order. His
presidency could change the strategic face of East Asia, potentially causing
a shift in the balance of power as well as aggravating tensions related to
hyper-nationalism, territorial disputes, geopolitical rivalry, and historical
animosity.
It is not yet possible to predict what Trump’s presidency will mean in
full for East Asian community-building, but what is clear is that the same
level of support that pro-global integration former President Obama has
provided for East Asian integration will not come easily. Revitalized
transnational coalitions among non-state actors stand at the cross-roads.
They could be caught in between tensions among national rivalries or
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brought into populist rhetoric and ideas. Conversely, they could mitigate
animosity arising from inward looking nationalist policies and social
movements as a way to create a space for greater citizen participation in
regional politics and generate a new capacity for regional
community-building. The strength of subnational ties among non-state
actors lies in their ability to overcome the barriers that exist at the level of
high politics and to forge shared understandings. They have carried out
meaningful underground work precisely because of, not in spite of, political
uncertainties found at the nation-state level. Moreover, Mr. Trump’s vic-
tory is not going to change the shared nature of environmental challenges
and the universality of values underlying human security issues that res-
onate powerfully in the minds of the general public.
Alternative visions of the world have pressed forward in the variant
forms of populism and nationalism, but the answer cannot be a simple
rejection of global and regional integration. Ensuring the shared benefits of
such integration and addressing subsequent problems calls for even broader
and deeper transnational coalitions and networks. East Asian
community-building efforts have been consolidated through major
geopolitical changes and several financial crises. The Trump factor will be
another testing ground for the resilience and strength of regional
community-building at both the ideational and operational levels.
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